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We provide an exact solution to the ideal-gas-like models studied in econophysics to understand
the microscopic origin of Pareto-law. In these classes of models the key ingredient necessary for
having a self-organized scale-free steady-state distribution is the trading or collision rule where
agents or particles save a definite fraction of their wealth or energy and invests the rest for trading.
Using a Gibbs ensemble approach we could obtain the exact distribution of wealth in this model.
Moreover we show that in this model (a) good savers are always rich and (b) every agent poor or
rich invests the same amount for trading. Nonlinear trading rules could alter the generic scenario
observed here.
PACS numbers: 05.90.+m, 89.90.+n, 02.50.−r, 87.23.Ge
Wealth and its distribution plays an important role in
society. Economic policies, natural resources, and human
psychology are certainly important factors which govern
the distribution of wealth. However, some features of the
distribution are independent of the details. As pointed
out by Pareto [1], a large fraction of the wealth in any
economy is always owned by a small fraction of the pop-
ulation and vice versa. His empirical formulation, later
named as Pareto’s law, describes that the distribution of
wealth w follows a power law P (w) = w−γ . Recent stud-
ies [2] of wealth distribution in several countries also con-
firm that it is indeed the behavior for the ”rich”, which
is only about 3% of the population. The rest follow a
exponential or Gibbs distribution. An interesting anal-
ogy [3, 4] has been drawn between the economic system
and a system of ideal gas where particles and their en-
ergies are modeled as agents and their wealth. Collision
between particles is similar to trading between agents
where energy or wealth is neither created nor destroyed;
it is just redistributed between agents. As pointed out by
Yakovenko[3], such a process obviously generates Gibbs-
like distributions observed for the majority of the popu-
lation.
Then what is the origin of power-law for the rich?
Chakrabarti and co-workers [4, 5] pointed out that sav-
ing is an important factor which decides and dictates the
distribution for the rich. In a generic society agents have
different opinions and concepts of saving and, accord-
ingly, each agent saves a fraction of his wealth and invests
the rest for trading. The available wealth is then shared
randomly between two interacting agents. These mod-
els generically predict a power-law distribution of wealth
with γ = 2. Later studies indicate that γ is not truly
universal and can be changed in certain specific cases.
A strikingly different distribution of wealth is observed
in a system of like-minded agents (when saving propen-
sity is the same for every agent), where it is asymmetric
and peaked below the average. Numerically it could be
well fitted to a Gamma distribution [6]; however, recent
studies indicate a discrepancy [7]. The exact form of the
distribution is still an open question and in this paper we
refer to it as Gamma-like distribution.
It is important to make a distinction between wealth
and money, although in this paper we have used one as
a synonym of the other. Wealth is usually refered to
things that have economic utility, e.g., money and prop-
erty. During an exchange of money for tangible property,
the wealth of the involved agents does not change. Again,
the effective value of tangible property in terms of mon-
etary units changes in time violating the conservation of
total wealth. Such realistic features of economy are not
included in [3] and [4, 5]; however, these simple mini-
mal models remarkably explain the universal two-class
feature of the wealth distributions. In particular, nu-
merical studies by Chatterjee, Chakrabarti, and Manna
(CCM) [5] clearly suggest an algebraic distribution of
wealth for the rich. Later studies (mainly numerical [8]
and a few analytical [9]), also reveal that algebraic distri-
butions are generic for the CCM model and its variants.
Exact results, however, are far from reach. In this paper
we will focus on the exact solution of a generic ideal-
gas-like economy where saving propensities of agents are
random and distributed arbitrarily. The CCM model is a
special case where the distribution of saving propensity is
uniform. Our results clarify why γ = 2 for most cases and
also show a way of getting a distributions when γ 6= 2.
We have also pointed out that in these class of models (a)
good savers are always rich and (b) every agent invests
on the average a fixed amount for trading.
To be more precise about the model let us consider a
system of L agents having their saving propensity 0 ≤
λ < 1 distributed as g(λ). The agents are labeled as
i = 0, 1, . . . , L−1 such that λ0 ≤ λ1 ≤ · · · ≤ λL−1. Let us
assume that initially total wealth is randomly distributed
among agents and the average is
E¯ =
1
N
∑
i
Ei.
A pair of agents, chosen randomly in this model, ex-
2change their wealth in the following way. Each agent i
saves λi fraction of its wealth and invests (1 − λi) frac-
tion for exchange. The available wealth for the pair i and
j is then shared among the agents in a random fashion.
Thus,
Ei → λiEi + ǫij [(1− λi)Ei + (1− λj)Ej ],
Ej → λjEj + (1− ǫij)[(1− λi)Ei + (1− λj)Ej ], (1)
where 0 < ǫij < 1 is chosen randomly for each trading
from a distribution h(ǫ) where the average is r = 〈ǫij〉.
It is quite evident that when λi = 0, the model is iden-
tical to the ideal gas model, where particles encounter
random elastic collisions. In this case, irrespective of the
initial distribution of energy or wealth, in equilibrium
(after a sufficiently large number of collisions) wealth is
redistributed according to Gibbs distribution with a tem-
perature suitably defined by E¯. It explains the wealth
distribution for a majority which follows the exponen-
tial law. To understand the origin of the power-law for
the rich, as explained by the authors of [4] we must in-
troduce savings. However, note that the particles are
no more identical once the saving propensity is different
for different agents. Then, one’s saving propensity is his
identity. It is thus appropriate to study the ensemble of
such systems. The idea of an ensemble is not new in sta-
tistical physics. It is a collection of infinitely many mental
copies of systems prepared under the same macroscopic
conditions. Physical observables are then needed to be
averaged over the ensemble to get rid of the microscopic
fluctuations. Let us study an ensemble of N systems
labeled by α = 1, . . . , N , prepared with the same aver-
age energy E¯. Thus, in each system {λi} are the same
whereas the initial wealth is different in different systems.
Also different is the sequence of pairs (i, j) selected for
trading and the sharing of available wealth between the
pair (ǫαij) during each trading. Thus, it is appropriate
to find out the distribution of ensemble-averaged wealth
defined by
wi =
1
N
N∑
α
Eαi , (2)
where Eαi is the wealth of an individual i in system α. In
a large system (L→∞) agent x = i/L has wealth w(x)
and saving propensity λ(x). Since x is uniform in (0, 1),
λ(x) can be obtained from the conservation of probability
element
g(λ)dλ = dx. (3)
Now we can proceed to derive an effective model of
exchange for w(x). First, note that since the pair of
agents are chosen randomly for exchange, a specific agent
x interacts with different agents in different systems in
the ensemble. Eventually agent x interacts with every
other agent when N → ∞. Second, that for a given
pair x and y, ǫxy is different in different systems and the
effective sharing is 〈ǫxy〉 = r. Thus, during trading with
y, the average wealth w(x) of agent x changes to w′(x; y),
where
w′(x; y) = [r + λ(x)(1 − r)]w(x) + r[1 − λ(y)]w(y). (4)
Since w(x) is stationary in the steady state, we must have
w(x) =
∫ 1
0
w′(x; y)dy. (5)
Equation (5), together with (4), can be solved as
w(x) =
C
1− λ(x)
, (6)
where C is an arbitrary constant, can be fixed by the
average wealth E¯. Explicitly,
∫ 1
0
w(x)dx = E¯. (7)
Note that neither r nor h(ǫ) appears in Eq. (6).
The distribution of w must satisfy P (w)dw = dx; thus
P (w) =
dx
dw
=
Cg(1− C/w)
w2
. (8)
Here the quantity after the last equality is derived using
Eqs. (6) and (3). It is clear from (8) that the asymptotic
wealth distribution for a generic g(λ) is P (w) ∼ w−γ
with γ = 2. However one can choose g(λ) = g˜(1 − λ)
to get a different power law γ 6= 2. For example, when
g(λ) = A(1 − λ)α defined in the interval 0 < λ < 1 one
gets
P (w) = A
C1+α
w2+α
, (9)
which has been reported earlier [4].
To compare the exact results with the numerical sim-
ulations, we must understand certain existing numerical
difficulties of the model. First, that the saving propen-
sity is never unity. An agent having saving propensity
λ = 1 is a troublesome member of the system who never
invests and gains by interacting with other members and
ultimately owns the whole wealth. In usual numerical
simulations, the maximum saving propensity for a cho-
sen set {λi} is q ≈ 1. For example in CCM model 1 − q
is O(1/L). We must account for this correction while
evaluating C. To do so let us look for a generic system
where the saving propensity is uniformly distributed in
(0, q). In this case λ(x) = qx and using the procedure
described here one gets
w(x) =
C
q−1 − x
with C = −
E¯
ln(1− q)
. (10)
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FIG. 1: Exact results for the CCM model [5] is compared with
numerical simulations. Practically they are indistinguishable.
Main figure shows individual wealth of the agents arranged in
a nondecreasing order of their saving propensity. The inset
compares cumulative distribution of wealth. Parameters are
L = 104 and N = 104.
So, for the CCM model C ∼ E¯/ ln(L). Alternately one
can calculate C as follows. The CCM model is equivalent
to a system of L agents with λi = i/L. In this case,
strictly q = 1− 1/L and thus C = E¯/ ln(L).
For comparison, we have performed a numerical sim-
ulation in a ensemble of N = 104 systems, each having
L = 104 agents. The saving propensity is chosen from a
uniform distribution in the interval (0, 1) and is ordered
in all the systems such that λ0 ≤ λ1 ≤ . . . λL−1. Initial
wealth is also chosen randomly in each system with fixed
E¯. Thus the stating wealth of any particular agent is dif-
ferent in different systems. Average wealth of each agent
wi is calculated after 10
3 Monte Carlo steps and then the
distribution P (w) is evaluated. Figure 1 compares w and
P (w) with exact results.
The results discussed in Eq. (10) are valid for any q,
where one expects P (w) = C/w2. However, earlier nu-
merical studies [4] have reported a power-law distribution
only for large q. The discrepancy can be explained as fol-
lows. The minimum wealth of the system is w(0) = qC
and the maximum is w(1) = qC/(1 − q2). The width of
the interval q3C/(1− q2) is quite small for small q unless
C is large. Since C is proportional to E¯ one must take
large average wealth to see such a power law. Beacause
of the finite lower limit in w, the cumulative distribution
P (w > m) = 1 − q−1 + C/n shows a power law up to a
constant. We have plotted P (w > m) + q−1 − 1 vs m in
logarithmic scale in Fig. 2 which perfectly fits to C/m
(see figure caption for details).
It is interesting to ask what happens when two dif-
ferent economies interact? For example take a sys-
tem of L agents, of which q and 1 − q fractions be-
long to two different organizations σ = ±. Their sav-
ing propensity distributed according to gσ(λ), respec-
tively, with 0 < λ < 1. During trading agent i of type
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FIG. 2: w(x) obtained from simulations of a restricted saving
model (0 < λi < q) is plotted together with the exact result
(10). Inset compares the cumulative distribution of wealth.
Here q = 0.8, L = 104 = N , and E¯ = 50.
σ interacts with agent j (type σ′) and shares ǫij(σ, σ
′)
and 1 − ǫij(σ, σ
′) fraction of ”available wealth”, respec-
tively. Let us assume that 〈ǫij(σ, σ
′)〉 = rσσ′ (obviously
r+− = r−+). The distribution of the grand system is
now g(λ) = qg+(λ) + pg−(λ) and the effective sharing
is r = q2r++ + (1 − q)
2r−− + 2q(1 − q)r+−. No matter
what the value of r is, Eq. (6) is still valid and thus the
distribution of wealth is given by Eq. (8). So the power
law P (w) ∼ w−2 and even Eq. (6) are quite robust.
Equation (6) is the central result of this paper, which
states that the wealth of an agent having saving propen-
sity λ is inversely proportional to 1 − λ, irrespective of
what the distribution g(λ) and h(ǫ) are. It clearly indi-
cates that on the average each agent, independent of how
rich or poor he is, invests a constant wealth C (which is
of course (1 − λ) fraction of his individual wealth) for
trading [10]. And then with equal probability he receives
r or 1 − r fraction of the available wealth 2C. Thus,
on the average, the individual wealth is preserved in the
steady state.
One can instead write Eq. (6) as
w(λ) =
C
1− λ
with C−1 = E¯−1
∫
g(λ)dλ
1− λ
(11)
thus, better saving means better wealth. To verify the ro-
bustness of Eq. (11) let us divide the system of L agents
with their savings distributed uniformly in (0, q) into two
groups : (a) the poor savers who have λi < z and (b) the
rich savers who have z ≤ λ < q. If the poor savers in-
teract only with the poor and the rich savers interact
only with the rich, clearly the system breaks up into two
independent subsystems of size zL and (q − z)L, respec-
tively. Correspondingly wealth for the poor and the rich
are wp(λ) = Cp/(1 − λ) and wr(λ) = Cr/(1 − λ), where
Cp and Cr are to be determined independently from the
initial average of wealth in each system. The total distri-
bution of wealth is P (w) = zPp(w)+(q−z)Pr(w), where
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FIG. 3: (a) w(λ) for the poor-rich system, where poor savers
own 2/3 of the total wealth. Inset shows corresponding
cumulative distribution of wealth. (b) w(λ) for the poor-
intermediate-rich model compared with CCM model [5]. Here
z = 0.4, b = 0.6, q = 0.95 and, L = 104 = N .
the distribution for the poor and the rich are Pr,p(w) =
Cr,p/w
2, nonzero in the interval wp(0) < w < wp(z),
and wr(z) < w < wp(1), respectively. Depending on the
choice of parameters one can get different intervals where
Pp, Pr , both or none of them contribute to P (w). For
a certain choice, as described in the inset of Fig. 3, it is
possible to obtain a cumulative wealth distribution which
resembles the one observed in reality. Correspondingly a
poor-rich break up at λ = 0.4 is shown in Fig. 3(a). This
discontinuity disappears once some intermediate savers
(whose saving propensities are limited to z < λi < b) are
introduced who can interact with both the poor and the
rich savers. Surprisingly w(λ) and P (w) in this system
are identical to that of the original CCM model where
every agent interacts with every other agent. Fig. 3(b)
compares w(x) obtained from a numerical simulation for
the poor-intermediate-rich system with the exact results.
This suggests that that each agent in the system stands
by their own. Irrespective of their distribution of saving
propensity and interaction with other agents, any tagged
agent who has saving propensity λ acquires wealth which
is inversely proportional to (1−λ). Equation (11) is thus
quite robust.
So far we have discussed the distribution of wealth
in a ensemble of infinitely many identical systems. In-
stead, if we look at any given system which is a member
of the ensemble, wealth of any particular agent (saving
propensity λ) would show fluctuations about the average
w = C/(1 − λ). Such fluctuations have been studied in
[11]. These numerical studies indicate that the distri-
bution of fluctuations P (E) for any tagged agent (sav-
ing propensity λ) is a Gamma-like distribution which is
asymmetric about the mean w = C/(1−λ) and is peaked
at Ec < w. It is also known that the distribution becomes
symmetric with Ec approaching w when λ → 1. Since
usually agents are crowded around the peak of the dis-
tribution, in any particular system in the ensemble P (E)
is not very different from P (Ec). Thus for the rich (who
have λ ≈ 1), the distribution of wealth P (E) is the same
as P (w) (as Ec ≈ w), which explains the Pareto law for
the rich in every system in a ensemble [12]. Whereas
deviation of P (E) from a power law is expected for the
poor. An exact study of fluctuations could reveal the
discrepancy.
What happens in a system of identical agents (each
having same saving propensity λ)? Note that we need
not consider identical copies of the systems now. The
system itself is an ensemble of identical agents. Clearly
the average wealth is w = C/(1 − λ) = E¯, and thus
the probability distribution P (w) = δ(w − E¯). Agents
in the system differ by their fluctuations and thus the
distribution of wealth at any given instant would only
count the fluctuations about the average E¯, which is not
different from the distribution of fluctuations of a tagged
agent in CCM model. Extensive numerical simulations
[4] have shown a Gamma-like distribution in this case.
Further analytic study might shed light on the exact form
of distribution.
In conclusion, we have provided an exact solution
to the ideal-gas-like markets using Gibbs ensemble ap-
proach. We point out that in a system of nonidentical
agents, it is appropriate to consider infinitely many iden-
tical copies of the systems differing by their initial condi-
tions. Such ensembles represent the evolution of several
identical systems under the same macroscopic conditions
and, thus, physical observables make sense only as an
ensemble-averaged quantity. One single system, instead,
would encounter fluctuations which are sometimes incal-
culably complex. A system of agents having the same
saving propensity is such a case, where average quanti-
ties like wealth are identical for every agent and fluctua-
tions are the only things that count. The central result
revealed from our exact solution is that in ideal-gas-like
markets, irrespective of the details of the interaction and
distribution of saving propensity, an agent having saving
propensity λ would, on the average, acquire wealth which
is inversely proportional to 1 − λ, i.e., better savers are
richer. Thus, every agent, poor ( small λ) or rich (large
λ), on the average invests the same amount for trading,
contrary to the real economy where rich agents usually
invest more. To alter such scenario one might modify
this minimal model so that the investment is non-linear
in w [note that current investment (1 − λ)w is linear].
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